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JUSTICE SCALIA’S PETARD AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
Ruthann Robson* 
 
Justice Antonin Scalia is well known not only for his conservative 
views, but also his literary language. So perhaps he might appreciate how 
the Shakespearean phrase, “hoist with his own petard,”1 could describe how 
his dissents are being used to support the very outcome he derided: the 
constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage. 
In United States v. Windsor decided in June 2013, the Court, by a bare 
majority, declared unconstitutional section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) which prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages even 
if the marriages were recognized by state law.2 As in two other important 
cases involving lesbian and gay rights, Romer v. Evans (1996)3 and 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003),4 Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the 
majority longer on rhetoric than on analysis and Justice Scalia wrote a 
dissent guaranteed to be called “scathing.” In these dissents, Justice Scalia 
not only criticized the majority opinion’s lack of rigor and exercise of 
judicial supremacy, but he warned of the consequences of the Court’s 
decision. 
In Romer, Justice Scalia’s alarm was loud, if imprecise. He famously 
                                                
* Professor of Law and University Distinguished Professor, City University of New 
York School of Law. Contact information: robson@law.cuny.edu. I am appreciative of 
research assistance from CUNY School of Law students Aliya Shain and AnnaJames 
Wipfler, as well as superb editing from Footnote Forum Editor Allison Reddy and the staff 
of CUNY Law Review. 
1 William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 3, sc. 4. 
2 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For further discussion of Windsor, 
see Ruthann Robson, Case Comment: United States v. Windsor, CUNY LAW REVIEW: 
FOOTNOTE FORUM (Sept. 2013), http://www.cunylawreview.org/prof-ruthann-robson-on-u-
s-v-windsor/. 
3 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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accused the Court, like other legal elites—including law schools—of taking 
sides in the “culture wars” by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.5 
At that time, Congress had just passed the Solomon Amendment,6 
denying federal funding to law schools that enforced their non-
discrimination policy against military recruiters because of the military’s 
exclusion of homosexuals. A decade later, the Court unanimously upheld 
the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment in Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (2006).7 But Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Romer might also be read as signaling the end of Bowers v. Hardwick 
(1986),8 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy; Scalia’s dissent in Romer chastises the majority for 
not even mentioning this holding.9 
Lawrence v. Texas achieved Scalia’s implicit prediction regarding the 
demise of Bowers v. Hardwick. In his dissent in Lawrence, he repeats (and 
at times quotes) his earlier accusations regarding lack of rigor and assertion 
of judicial supremacy.10 He adds a further criticism regarding the Court’s 
failure to honor stare decisis.11 
Although he agrees that Romer v. Evans “eroded” Bowers v. Hardwick, 
he argues that subsequent decisions equally eroded Roe v. Wade and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, although the majority 
insists on adhering to stare decisis in the abortion context.12 But Justice 
                                                
5 Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When the Court takes sides in the 
culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically 
with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the 
Court’s Members are drawn.”). 
6 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West 2013). 
7 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
8 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
9 Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10 See, e.g., 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
application of “an unheard-of form of rational basis review); id. at 587 (implying the 
majority was “manipulative” in invoking stare decisis); id. at 588 (calling Casey’s “famed 
sweet-mystery-of-life passage” the “passage that ate the rule of law”); id. at 591 (declaring 
the Bowers overruling “a massive disruption of the current social order”); id. at  603 
(stating that Texas’ “hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 
‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change”); id. at 604 (calling 
the conclusion of the Court an imposition “by a governing caste that knows best”). 
11 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Liberty finds no refuge in a 
jurisprudence of doubt.’ That was the Court’s sententious response, barely more than a 
decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe v. Wade. The Court’s response today, to those 
who have engaged in a 17–year crusade to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick is very different. 
The need for stability and certainty presents no barrier.”). 
12 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) and Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice Scalia points to Washington v. Glucksberg, 
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Scalia’s specific admonitory tones in the Lawrence dissent are directed at 
same-sex marriage and focus on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence13 that 
would have invalidated the Texas sodomy law on equal protection grounds. 
Scalia writes that O’Connor’s “reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds 
state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”14 But in Lawrence’s 
majority opinion—resting on due process grounds—Justice Kennedy stated 
that the Court’s opinion “does not involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.”15 And indeed, it often seemed as if the often-called “caveat 
paragraph” in Lawrence v. Texas, which excluded not only relationships 
and marriage, but also minors, public sex, and commercial sex, was the 
portion of Lawrence most likely to be quoted in other judicial decisions. 
But again, perhaps Justice Scalia’s dissenting remarks in Lawrence, 
albeit not focused on the majority opinion, proved prescient. For in United 
States v. Windsor, holding section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional, the Court 
relied upon Lawrence, as well as on Romer v. Evans. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy opined that DOMA “places same-sex couples in an 
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage,” a “differentiation” that 
“demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution 
protects,” citing Lawrence.16 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s opinion relies 
upon language from Romer, decided less than six months before Congress 
passed DOMA, to label DOMA as a “discrimination of an unusual 
character” thus requiring “careful consideration.”17 In his dissent, Scalia 
excoriates the majority with familiar—and well-founded—charges of lack 
of analytic rigor.18 The sections of the dissenting opinion that Scalia devotes 
to disagreement with the Court’s finding of Article III power to hear the 
case contain his customary judicial supremacy argument.19 
The charges regarding stare decisis are muted, as they must be, and the 
allegations of “an arrogant legal culture” have moved to a footnote in 
Justice Alito’s dissent, where they are leveled against “some professors of 
                                                                                                                       
521 U.S. 702 (1997), as eroding Roe and Casey with its holding that substantive due 
process requires heightened scrutiny only in cases implicating fundamental rights “ ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). 
13 Id. at 579–585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
14 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. at 578. 
16 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
17 Id. at 2692. 
18 See, e.g., id. at 2705–09 (attacking the majority’s reasoning as “rootless and 
shifting,” “perplexing,” “scatter-shot,” and full of “legalistic argle-bargle”). 
19 See, e.g., id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have no power to decide this 
case. And even if we did, we have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this 
democratically adopted legislation. The Court’s errors on both points spring forth from the 
same diseased root: an exalted conception of the role of this institution in America.”). 
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constitutional law” and not aimed at the Court itself.20 
But what achieves a level of clarity in Scalia’s dissent is Windsor’s 
applicability to state same-sex marriage bans. Scalia notes that the majority 
in Windsor does contain a “penultimate sentence” limiting the Windsor 
decision to DOMA. This strategy, he writes, takes “real cheek” given the 
Windsor majority’s reliance on Lawrence despite its similar limitation.21 
Scalia employs vivid language—at least for those who recognize the 
idiomatic expression of inevitability—when he refers to “the second, state-
law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term” and later repeats the shoe 
image.22 Backtracking a bit with a qualification of belief, he also accuses 
the Court of writing passages in Windsor to be “transposable” to any state 
same-sex marriage case.23 He writes that “the view that this Court will take 
of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond mistaking” by 
the majority’s opinion in Windsor.24 It is “easy” and indeed, “inevitable,” to 
reach the same conclusion regarding state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage as the Court did with DOMA prohibiting federal recognition.25 
And he provides illustrations, complete with a strike out of DOMA and an 
insertion of “this state’s laws” in two passages and in the third, a simple 
alteration of what Scalia calls the “invented number” of children being 
raised by same-sex couples from “tens of thousands” nationally to be 
“thousands” for the applicable state.26 Again, Scalia invokes the shoe idiom: 
“no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the 
other shoe.”27 Scalia pronounces that the majority opinion “arms well every 
challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.”28 
But perhaps it is Scalia who has “armed well” those who would 
challenge—or decide—state same-sex marriage prohibitions. Since 
Windsor, a number of different district judges have found state laws 
prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage unconstitutional: DeLeon 
v. Perry from the Western District of Texas;29 Bostic v. Rainey from the 
                                                
20 Id. at 2720, n.7 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
21 Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22 Id. at 2705, 2709. 
23 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 2709. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 2710. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 DeLeon v. Perry, No. 5:13-cv-00982-OLG (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/deleonvperrypi.pdf; see also Ruthann Robson, 
Federal Judge Declares Texas Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (February 26, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
conlaw/2014/02/federal-judge-declares-texas-same-sex-marriage-ban-
unconstitutional.html. 
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Eastern District of Virginia;30 Bourke v. Beshear from the Western District 
of Kentucky;31 Bishop v. United States from the Northern District of 
Oklahoma;32 Obergefell v. Wymyslo from the Southern District of Ohio;33 
and Kitchen v. Herbert from the District of Utah.34 
All of these judges rely on Scalia’s dissents and almost all mention 
Scalia’s dissent in Windsor. Scalia’s language—the “arms well,” the shoe 
dropping, the “beyond mistaking,” and the “easy” “inevitable” 
consequences of the majority’s opinion in Windsor—is repeated and 
ratified.35 At times the quoted material is condensed and at other times 
scattered throughout the opinion. Some times the quoted material is 
extensive, at times it is in a footnote, and at times it rests in a parenthetical. 
But beyond mistaking, it is there, and perhaps inevitable. 
Indeed, several judges explicitly express their accord. One judge notes 
that it is “just as Justice Scalia predicted.”36 Another judge opines that the 
propriety of invoking the Constitution to protect the rights of lesbian and 
gay citizens was “described eloquently” by the “Honorable Antonin 
Scalia.”37 And another judge “agrees with Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
                                                
30 Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13–cv–395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014), 
available at https://casetext.com/case/bostic-v-rainey#.UwUNXl5kImt. 
31 Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13–cv–750–H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 
2014), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/bourkevbeshearky.pdf; see also 
Ruthann Robson, Kentucky Federal judge Rules State’s Nonrecognition of Same-Sex 
Marriages Violates Equal Protection, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2014/02/kentucky-federal-judge-rules-states-
nonrecognition-of-same-sex-marriages-violates-equal-protection.html. 
32 Bishop v. United States, No. 04–cv–848–TCK–TLW, 2009 WL 4505951 (N.D. 
Okla. Nov. 24, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/1505878-0–32667.pdf; see 
also Ruthann Robson, Oklahoma District Judge Invalidates State’s Prohibition of Same-
Sex Marriage (But Stays Judgment), CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (January 14, 
2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2014/01/oklahoma-district-judge-
invalidates-states-prohibition-of-same-sex-marriage-but-stays-judgment.html. 
33 Obergefell v. Wymyslo, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 6726688 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/obergefell.pdf; see also 
Ruthann Robson, Ohio Federal Judge Issues Permanent Injunction in Ohio Same-Sex 
Marriage Case, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/12/ohio-federal-judge-issues-permanent-
injunction-in-ohio-same-sex-marriage-case.html. 
34 Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13–cv–217, 2014 U.S. WL 30367 (C.D. Utah Jan. 6, 
2014), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/kitchen-court-ruling-131220.pdf; 
see also Ruthann Robson, U.S. Supreme Court Stays Utah’s Same-Sex Marriage Decision, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
conlaw/2014/01/us-supreme-court-stays-utahs-same-sex-marriage-decision.html. 
35 See, e.g., Obergefell, slip op. at 3; Bostic, slip op. at 26; Kitchen, slip op. at 13; 
Bourke, slip op. at 14; DeLeon, slip op. at 29; Bishop, slip op. at 65. 
36 Obergefell, slip op. at 3. 
37 Bostic, slip op. at 26. 
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Windsor.”38 
And while Scalia’s dissent in Windsor predominates, it is not alone. The 
judge who agrees with Scalia’s interpretation of Windsor also “agrees with 
the portion of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence in which 
Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s reasoning logically extends to protect 
an individual’s right to marry a person of the same sex.”39 Other judges also 
rely on the Lawrence dissent, seemingly admiring Scalia’s candor. “Justice 
Scalia was more blunt, stating that ‘preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of 
same-sex couples.”40 One judge who confines his Scalia citations to 
Lawrence and to parentheticals expresses the argument most economically: 
“However, tradition, alone, cannot form a rational basis for a law. See 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (‘Preserving the 
traditional institution of marriage . . . is just a kinder way of describing the 
State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples,’ which, in turn, is not a 
legitimate reason).”41 Another judge also quotes the “kinder” language to 
defeat the contention that this could be a legitimate state interest.42 
Interestingly, this judge notes that Justice Scalia has “repeatedly expressed 
his disagreement” with the conclusion that morality cannot be a legitimate 
government interest, but then adds: “However, these are dissenting 
opinions.”43 
Scalia’s dissenting opinions, like all dissenting opinions, have numerous 
functions. One of their purposes is akin to the petard: to attack the fortress 
of the majority opinion and exploit its weaknesses. But the danger of such 
an incendiary device is that its explosiveness can hurl the one who wields it 
into the air. In Shakespeare’s play, it is Hamlet’s erstwhile friends who are 
hoist by their own petard. Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern carry a message 
for the King of England that would result in Hamlet’s death; Hamlet 
changes the letter so that it refers to them. Here are the lines from Act III, 
Scene IV of Hamlet: 
 
Let it work; 
For ’tis the sport to have the enginer 
Hoist with his own petar’44 
 
It works. The device that brings about the pair’s demise is the very one they 
                                                
38 Kitchen, slip op. at 13. 
39 Id. at 31. 
40 Bourke, slip op. at 14. 
41 DeLeon, slip op. at 29. 
42 Bishop, slip op. at 65. 
43 Id. at 65, n.37. 
44 Shakespeare, supra note 2. 
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sought to use to have Hamlet killed. Sometimes that is called poetic justice. 
But while Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern may be dead, this does not 
mean that same-sex marriage prohibitions are extinct in every state. For that 
to happen, such a case would need to reach the United States Supreme 
Court and the majority would have to hold in the manner that Justice Scalia 
predicted. It would be refreshing if the majority opinion did evince the type 
of doctrinal rigor that has so often been absent.45 If it did, perhaps Justice 
Scalia’s dissent would not need to hurl such dangerous petards. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
45 For further discussion, see Ruthann Robson, Online same-sex marriage symposium: 
Toward a more perfect analysis, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 19, 2012, 9:57 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-same-sex-marriage-symposium-toward-a-
more-perfect-analysis/. 
